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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous literatures on both studies of pollution haven and FDI-corruption nexus 
have produced inconclusive results. This study uses Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) to address potential endogeneity of independent variables and 
country-specific effects issues when assessing the relationship between foreign 
direct investment (FDI), stringency of environmental regulations and corruption. 
FDI inflows are found to be discouraged by stricter environmental regulations and 
high level of corruption will induce FDI. Surprisingly, we find new evidence that 
both effects are changed after each of them exceeds threshold levels. Countries 
have to pass the threshold levels in order to gain positive impact of both stricter 
regulations and low level of corruption. 
Keywords: FDI; pollution haven; corruption; developing countries; developed 
countries. 
 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Developing and transition economies have increased their shares in global FDI inflows 
considerably within 1990 to 2012. There has been a persistent increase since 2001 and at 
the end of 2010, these nations have been accounted for over half of the global FDI inflows 
(see Figure 1). There are many key factors to describe this encouraging trend, among them 
are lower environmental regulations in these countries. Furthermore, in response to the 
downward global FDI trend since 2007, most countries have liberalized their investments 
regimes and are predicted to continue doing so (UNCTAD, 2010). These countries can be 
considered as “pollution haven” when large number of pollution-intensive industries 
entering these countries. Even though FDI inflows can raise level of pollution in 
developing countries, it can also be beneficial to these countries such as bringing cleaner 
or environmental friendly technologies from developed countries (see Atici (2012) for 
instance).  
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There is a common view that developing countries try to lower their environmental 
regulations in order to be competitive in the world markets and to be attractive prospect 
for FDI. Countries with high per capita income tend to have stricter environmental policy, 
and conversely countries with low per capita income tend to have lenient environmental 
policy, shown by high correlation between both indicators (Eliste & Fredriksson, 2001). 
Baumol and Oates (1988) claimed that under trade between two countries, countries with 
low environmental standards will specialize in polluting industries. Capital seems to be 
attracted to lower regulations countries rather than those with higher standards. Leidy and 
Hoekman (1994) found that polluting investors favour inefficient environmental policy 
instruments due to lower trade hindrances. Within 1970s and 1980s many polluting firms 
had allocated their capital flows to lower income countries with lenient environmental 
regulations (Low & Yeates, 1992). Since lax environmental regulations are always 
associated with developing countries, Birdsall and Wheeler (1992) found that proportion 
of pollution intensive sectors in developing countries increased as OECD environmental 
regulations were strengthened. Less developed countries were also attracted to poor 
environmental standards since these countries often employ outdated, imported 
technologies (Blackman, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Percentage shares of developing and transition economies  
in global FDI inflows 1990–2012 
 
Pollution haven effect did not necessarily occur only in developing countries as it is also 
occurred in developed countries. Mulatu et al. (2010) found that an increase of host’s 
environmental regulatory laxity in Europe does lead most polluting industry to locate in 
that country. Kalamova and Johnstone (2011) also found empirical evidence that the 
pollution haven occurs in OECD countries. 
 
Corruption can influence inward FDI, confirmed by earlier studies. Prior research 
has suggested practicing corruption to bypass bureaucratic procedures in order to induce 
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FDI (Leff, 1964). Public officials could accelerate economic activities (Leys, 1965) and 
earn own additional income via bribery. Low income among officials could possibly lead 
them to take bribe (Leys, 1965; Bailey, 1966). However, corruption may bring undesirable 
consequences such as negative economic growth in developed and developing countries 
via unproductive rent seeking activities (Krueger, 1974), lower productive investment 
(Mauro, 1995) and investment and trade policy (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2004). Additionally, 
corruption reduces government revenues (Bird et al, 2008), aggravates pollution and 
income per capita (Welsch, 2004). Past studies suggested that the role of corruption on 
FDI is mixed, either corruption act as a “grabbing hand” which increases the expenditures 
of carrying out economic activities or “helping hand” which assist the entry process of 
FDI or no influence.  
 
Furthermore, corruption is among the major causes of environmental degradation 
in developing countries (Damania, 2002). These countries have to find the right balance 
between industrialisation and environmental regulations. The purpose of this paper is to 
verify the existence of pollution haven effect in the presence of corruption across 
countries. This paper may help to reveal answers for mixed findings of pollution haven 
and FDI-corruption nexus. In particular, we provide empirical evidence to show how the 
effects of environmental regulations on FDI are changed. 
 
Race to the bottom competition has become the concern for environmentalists as 
countries might increase their comparative advantage by adopting lower environmental 
standards to attract foreign investment. However, lax environmental regulations in host 
countries can lead to environmental degradation. Corruption practice can hamper the 
strength of legislation in protecting host’s environment. Corrupted officials or entrusted 
authority might misuse their power for their own interest in the enforcement of 
environmental regulations (Damania, 2002). This study may assist government at national 
scale in formulating strategic environmental regulations in the presence of varying level of 
corruption. 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The effect of heterogenous environmental regulations on trade flows or FDI has reached 
into three different conclusions, whether it is negative, positive or no effect. Here we 
include the several causes of the mixed findings. This diverse can be described in terms of 
advanced technological production possessed by investors. Eskeland and Harrison (2003) 
found that FDI enterprises from polluting firms experienced more efficient energy use than 
their domestic competitors in host developing countries. Dean et al. (2009) also reached 
the similar conclusion showing that Multinational Enterprises and developed countries 
investors are found to be not affected by higher regulatory requirements in China.   
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Kheder and Zugravu (2012) support the finding of Dam and Scholtens (2008) who 
imply that poor environmental regulations in host countries hamper allocation of 
multinational firms with good corporate social responsibility. Behaviour among investors 
on the awareness towards environment would encourage investors to innovate green 
technology for their production instead of seeking for pollution haven (Costantini & 
Crespi, 2008). Good quality of regulatory framework in terms of its certainty and 
transparency in host countries attracted inward Japanese dirty FDI greater than the level of 
environmental regulatory measures (Kirkpatrick & Shimamoto, 2008).  
 
Ederington et al. (2005), Kellenberg (2009), and Wagner and Timmins (2009), 
have demonstrated that footloose or geographically mobile industries are more negatively 
affected by environmental policy rather than the dirty sectors. A strand of literature 
outlines the importance of estimation method or procedure. Smarzynska and Wei (2004) 
emphasized the essential of precise dependent variable measure and good proxies for 
stringency in order to reduce measurement-error bias. Levinson and Taylor (2008) suggest 
that most existing literatures have failed to account unobserved heterogeneity, unobserved 
foreign environmental regulations, and aggregation bias measurements of the relationship 
between both trade and pollution abatement costs. Failure to control agglomeration 
externalities does also mask the pollution haven effect (Wagner & Timmins, 2009). 
 
Cole et al. (2006) had made first attempt in examining if FDI influence 
environmental policy. They found that FDI will promote environmental policy to be more 
stringent (lenient) when the level of corruption of policymakers in host country is high 
(low). Their evidences gave support to previous literatures that countries necessitate to 
reduce their level of corruption in order to induce FDI and improve environmental quality. 
 
Recently, Barassi and Zhou (2012) used parametric and non-parametric method to 
reassess the mixed findings of the relationship between FDI and corruption. They stressed 
that the employment of parametric method in the existing literatures may have brought 
misleading results since parametric method treats homogeneous when figuring the effect 
of corruption on FDI across all the quantiles of FDI distribution. Non-parametric method 
employed unmasked the heterogeneity of the relationship between FDI and corruption at 
different quantiles of FDI stock. They found robust evidence that host countries with 
corruption level lower (higher) than the average of Corruption Perception Index would 
attract FDI stock higher (lower) than other host countries of the same percentile of the FDI 
stock. However, Barassi and Zhou (2012) and most existing studies of FDI-corruption 
ignore the presence of environmental regulations. Corruption might be insignificant when 
explaining foreign investment in the presence of environmental regulations (Fredriksson et 
al., 2003; Kellenberg, 2009) and corruption does not affect FDI inflows independently 
(Mudambi et al, 2013). 
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3.0 METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Model Specification 
 
We estimate the impact of environmental stringency and corruption on FDI inflow at the 
country level. The model specification is as follows: 
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where subscripts i and t denote country and year respectively, FDI INFLOW is FDI inflow 
of host country in terms of billions of dollars, STRICT is stringency of environmental 
regulations, HONESTY is level of corruption, and the rest is controlled variables 
hypothesized to influence FDI inflows: openness, inflation, GDP, GDP growth, total 
population, financial development and infrastructure. Some controlled variables represent 
natural logarithm. Country-specific effect is represented by η and β1, β2, β3, λ, α will be 
estimated by the GMM estimator, and ε is the error term. Lagged dependent variable is 
taken into account as data on FDI inflows often exhibit persistent trend. We conjecture that 
profit maximizing MNEs or investors respond homogeneously towards heterogeneous of 
environmental regulations. Therefore, sign for β1 is supposed to be negative which means 
relatively stringent environmental regulations deter FDI whilst lax environmental 
regulations induce FDI. In other words, pollution haven effect can be validated in this 
finding. Based on the Egger and Winner (2005), we could confirm that the expected sign 
of β2 is negative which means corruption is a stimulus for FDI. Based on the existing 
literatures, the expected sign for β3 is positive, indicating good quality of regulations 
encouraging inward FDI. The sign of the interaction term would contribute in the on-going 
debate particularly in the study of FDI and corruption. 
 
3.2 Dynamic Panel GMM Estimation  
 
Potential endogeneity of independent variables, inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 
and the presence of the country-specific effects have made impossible for us to estimate 
using panel estimation model such as pooled OLS, fixed and random effect respectively. 
Problems aforementioned would bring Nickel (1981) bias if we use the panel data 
estimation. Thus, generalized method of moment (GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) have the capability to combat these problems. GMM method can tackle the 
country-specific effects by taking the first differences of equation (1) but however, we 
suffer missing values of some explanatory variables and will subsequently bring 
difficulties in the transformed data (Roodman, 2009). Therefore, we use forward 
orthogonal deviation transformation procedure proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) to 
wipe out the country-specific effects. However, new bias appears resulted from forward 
orthogonal deviation, which is correlation between lagged dependent variable and the 
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error terms. Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) suggested that the 
lagged levels, lagged two or more periods to be used as instruments for the differenced 
lagged dependent variables and other endogenous variables. This method can be referred 
to either one-step or two-step difference GMM. 
 
Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) and Blundell and Bond (1998) showed that if 
the lagged dependent variable and independent variables follow a random walk or 
persistent over time, the lagged levels of these variables are poor instruments for the 
regression equation in differences. Arellano and Bover (1995) suggested GMM system 
estimator in order to reduce biases and imprecision produced by difference estimator by 
estimating the difference equation and the level equation as a system. In the system 
estimation, the instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged first-differenced 
variables. We adopt the two-step system GMM in this study since two-step GMM is more 
favoured than the one-step GMM in estimating the coefficient with lower bias and 
standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005). 
 
The unbiased, consistency and efficiency of the GMM estimator is contingent on 
three specification tests namely the Hansen or Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions, 
the serial correlation test for disturbances, and the difference in Hansen test for extra 
moment’s conditions (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; and Blundell & 
Bond, 1998). The Hansen or Sargan test is based on the overall validity of the instruments 
by analysing the sample analogue of the moment conditions used in the estimation 
process. Failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Hansen or Sargan test would indicate 
that the instruments employed are valid and the system GMM estimation are well 
specified. Serial correlation test is conducted by do not reject the null hypothesis of the 
absence of the first order serial correlation, AR(1) and/or (just in case when the null 
hypothesis is rejected) do not reject the absence of the second order serial correlation, 
AR(2). Failure to reject the null hypotheses of difference in Hansen test would give 
support to the validity of additional moment conditions. These three specification tests are 
considered in this paper. 
 
3.3 Data Source 
 
We test the model using unbalanced panel data from a mix of 110 developed and 
developing countries for the period of 2006 to 2010. FDI Inflow data is expressed as FDI 
inflows billions of dollars and are available in the UNCTAD. Environmental Performance 
Index (EPI) obtained from http://epi.yale.edu/ is used as a proxy for stringency of 
environmental regulations. We check the robustness of our result by substituting EPI data 
with data from the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Executive Opinion Survey. The 
WEF’s stringency of environmental regulation index has been widely used to measure 
stringency of environmental regulations in recent studies (e.g. Kalamova & Johnstone, 
2011). Corruption perception index (CPI) was obtained from Transparency International to 
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measure the level of corruption in host countries. The index scaled from 0 to 10 where the 
higher score indicates higher level of honesty. Hence, in this paper, negative coefficient for 
HONESTY means high level of corruption induces FDI. The remaining controlled 
variables were obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI). Table of 
descriptive statistics are included in Appendix A. 
 
4.0 RESULTS 
 
Initially we report the estimation results of the baseline model and we subsequently report 
results for robustness check after considering another alternative variable to measure the 
stringency of environmental regulations. 
 
Table 1: Two-step system GMM estimation on FDI inflows, regulatory stringency and corruption 
Dependent variable: FDI inflows 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FDI INFLOW (-1) 0.511*** 0.327*** 0.300*** 0.300*** 0 .301*** 
STRICT -0.683*** -0.997*** -0.955*** -0.951*** -0.937*** 
HONESTY -5.501*** -9.280*** -8.585*** -8.055*** -8.082*** 
STRICT*HONESTY 0.132*** 0.185*** 0.167*** 0.162*** 0.163*** 
GDP GROWTH  0.430*** 0.438*** 0.353*** 0.401*** 0.406*** 
INFLATION  -0.136 0.007 0.026 0.030* - 
FINANCIAL - 0.024*** 0.019** 0.016* 0.013* 
LnGDP - 4.668*** 5.673*** 4.572*** 4.479*** 
LnPOPULATION - - 0.676* 1.607*** 1.705*** 
LnOPENNESS - - 3.636*** 3.273*** 3.425*** 
LnINFRASTRUCTURE - - - 1.385*** 1.367*** 
CONSTANT 31.811*** 31.056*** 3.843 -3.240 -4.771 
AR(1): p-value 0.033 0.038 0.042 0.040 0.040 
AR(2): p-value 0.190 0.145 0.147 0.144 0.144 
Hansen test: p-value 0.358 0.233 0.186 0.272 0.309 
Number of observations 417 400 400 400 400 
Number of countries 108 107 107 107 107 
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. All p-value of the 
difference in Hansen tests of exogeneity of instruments subsets are not rejected at the 5% 
significance level. Some countries are dropped in the estimations due to inadequacy in 
lagged instruments. 
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Based on the three specification tests conducted, the GMM estimators are said to 
be unbiased, consistent and efficient. The sign for environmental regulatory stringency 
support pollution haven effect in which stringent environmental regulations is found to 
discourage allocation of FDI. They suggest that a point increase in stringency is related to 
the decrease in FDI inflows by roughly 6.83 to 9.97 US billions of dollars. In line with 
Kalamova and Johnstone (2011), pollution haven occurred in developed and less 
developed countries. The impact of honesty in host countries on the level of FDI inflow is 
significant and negative. Our results are consistent with Egger and Winner (2005) in which 
corruption can be “helping hand” for FDI inflow. 
 
Surprisingly, the interaction term (STRICT*HONESTY) effect is inversed which 
means that both the negative effects aforementioned are changed at certain levels, holding 
all other factors constant. Both threshold points reveal the answer for on-going debate of 
the impact of FDI towards both environmental regulations and corruption. The threshold 
level for stringency of environmental can be estimated as –β2/β3. Based on the estimation 
(4), the outcome implies that the effect of environmental regulatory stringency on FDI is 
negative (positive) when the score for stringency is lower (higher) than 49.72 (= - (- 
8.055) / 0.162).  
 
While the threshold level for corruption or honesty can be estimated as –β1/β3. 
Based on the estimation (4), the outcome implies that the effect of honesty on FDI is 
negative (positive) when the score for honesty is lower (higher) than 5.87 (= - (- 0.951) / 
0.162). This corruption’s threshold value seemed somewhat complements the findings of 
Barassi and Zhou (2012) in which less corrupt country would encourage more FDI stock 
than more corrupt country, if they share the same percentile in the FDI stock cumulative 
distribution. The positive coefficients of the interaction term are consistent with 
Kirkpatrick and Shimamoto (2008) and implies that transparent, consistent, and 
accountable in regulatory environment can provide perception of a safer investment 
climate and subsequently gained investor’s confidence towards host countries, hence 
encourage FDI. Our results contradict to the findings of Kheder and Zugravu (2012) who 
declared that investors favour countries with relatively weak environmental regulations 
regardless of the corruption level of host countries. 
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Table 2: Robustness check with WEF’s stringency of environmental regulation as alternative 
variable 
 
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. All p-value of the 
difference in Hansen tests of exogeneity of instruments subsets are not rejected at the 10% 
significance level. Some countries or cross sections are dropped in the estimations due to 
inadequacy in lagged instruments. 
 
Table 2 shows that the sign for all the coefficients in bold are significant and same 
as the previous estimation. This strongly implies that pollution haven occurs in which 
stricter environmental regulations impeded FDI whilst lenient environmental regulations 
induced FDI. Helping hand is also supported in the result since low level of corruption 
will impede FDI while high level of corruption in host countries will induce FDI. 
Interestingly, significant and positive coefficient of the interaction between stringency and 
corruption provide robust evidence and these consistent outcomes strongly suggest both 
the effects of stringency and corruption toward FDI is contingent on the threshold levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: FDI inflows   
Independent variables (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
FDI INFLOW (-1) 0.207*** 0.212*** 0.205*** 0.217*** 0.224*** 
STRICT  -8.752*** -8.596*** -8.958*** -7.546*** -8.128*** 
HONESTY -4.761* -4.454* -5.366** -5.335** -3.704* 
STRICT*HONESTY 1.460*** 1.416*** 1.563*** 1.263*** 1.282*** 
GDP GROWTH 0.344*** 0.344*** 0.296*** 0.370*** 0.399*** 
INFLATION  -0.006 - -0.012 0.023 0.022 
FINANCIAL  0.060** 0.063** 0.057** 0.056* 0.075*** 
LnGDP 2.096* 1.603* 2.837*** 5.309*** 1.101 
LnPOPULATION 3.830*** 4.220*** 3.491*** - 3.690*** 
LnOPENNESS 3.312** 3.100** 4.360*** 0.459 - 
LnINFRASTRUCTURE 1.385 1.300* - 0.154 1.429* 
CONSTANT -32.575*** -35.291** -32.873** 5.867 -18.522 
AR(1): p-value 0.051 0.051 0.055 0.053 0.048 
Hansen test: p-value 0.191 0.201 0.195 0.210 0.218 
Number of observations 285 285 285 285 285 
Number of countries 100 100 100 100 100 
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5.0 CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The purpose of this study is to empirically assess the role of corruption and stringency of 
environmental regulations on FDI inflows in 110 developed and developing countries 
within period of 2006 to 2010. GMM estimation is employed to control for potential 
endogeneity of independent variables and country specific effect. We find that differences 
in environmental regulatory stringency in host countries are a significant determinant of 
FDI inflows but the effect is conditional on the level of corruption. Robust evidence is 
found for the effect environmental regulatory stringency on FDI is negative (positive) 
when the level of corruption is higher (lower). 
 
Countries with stringent environmental regulations such as Czech Republic, 
Slovak Republic, Italy and Greece should improve their level of corruption. An 
improvement in corruption can speed up the development process (Myrdal, 1968) and 
attract the most efficient producers to invest (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) and subsequently 
improve its environmental performance. For developing countries, since FDI brings 
advanced technologies, their corruption level among public officials need to be reduced 
and environmental policy should be enhanced. Political stability in these countries play 
role in this part, as previous studies claimed that level of corruption affect stringency of 
environmental regulations only when there is instability in political affairs. Transparent, 
stable and accountable environmental regulation is dependence on the neutrality of a host 
government (Parker, 1999). We stress the importance of institutional development in these 
countries since it will lead the regulatory system of environmental protection become 
more transparent, consistent, and rigorous. All countries are not necessary to engage in the 
race to the bottom competition. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A. List of Countries 
 
Angola Finland Luxembourg Senegal 
Argentina France Macedonia Serbia 
Armenia Gabon Malaysia Singapore 
Australia Georgia Malta Slovak Republic 
Austria Germany Mexico Slovenia 
Azerbaijan Ghana Moldova South Africa 
Belarus Greece Mongolia Spain 
Belgium Guatemala Morocco Sri Lanka 
Bolivia Haiti Mozambique Sudan 
Botswana Honduras Namibia Sweden 
Brazil Hungary Nepal Switzerland 
Bulgaria Iceland Netherlands Syria 
Cameroon India New Zealand Tajikistan 
Canada Indonesia Nicaragua Tanzania 
China Iran Nigeria Thailand 
Colombia Ireland Norway Togo 
Costa Rica Italy Oman Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Cote d'Ivoire Jamaica Pakistan Tunisia 
Croatia Japan Panama Turkey 
Cyprus Jordan Paraguay Ukraine 
Czech Republic Kazakhstan Peru United Arab 
Emirates 
Denmark Kenya Philippines United Kingdom 
Ecuador Korea, Rep. Poland Uruguay 
Egypt Kuwait Portugal Vietnam 
El Salvador Kyrgyz Republic Qatar Yemen 
Eritrea Latvia Romania Zambia 
Estonia Libya Russia 
 Ethiopia Lithuania Saudi Arabia 
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B. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
FDI inflows (bill) 10.46 22.66 -28.26 196.39 
Environmental Performance Index 
(EPI) 
53.47 9.58 32.54 77.99 
WEF’s stringency of environmental 
regulation  
4.16 1.10 2.00 6.70 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 4.44 2.23 1.40 9.60 
GDP growth  3.89 4.99 -17.95 34.50 
Inflation, consumer prices  6.11 5.16 -4.86 44.39 
Private sector credit (% of GDP) 96.89 683.39 6.03 15788.26 
GDP (current US$) 377.07 814.76 1.21 5930.53 
Total population (per 1000 people) 50446.36 168726.40 214.65 1337705.00 
Openness ((Export+Import)/GDP) 92.42 51.45 22.12 444.10 
Telephone lines (per 100 people) 22.96 18.13 0.29 67.24 
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